Recent ethical and moral lapses, defined as decisions or actions not in line with the Air Force Core Values, are not isolated occurrences. Rather, they are punctuated events on a spectrum of behavior. 1his spectrum exists in a complex culture with competing and conflicting values and interests that can create a moral dilemma for Airmen. Positive and negative behavioral drivel> detennine the choices of an individual who is faced with such a dilemma. An organization can also influence the individual's decision-making through separate negative drivers collectively referred to as moral gravity. Lapses in an individual's conunitment to the Air Force Core Values occur when positive individual drivers are not emphasized in the presence of moral gravity. The pwpose of this report is to identify specific actions that will eliminate negative drivers and replicate positive drivers, and thus promote behavior and decision-making more in line wifu the Core Values. Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302 Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number 1. REPORT DATE
Next, Think Tank 14D proposes four specific actions for promoting ethical behavior by addressing the core drivers. First, developing specific roles and responsibilities for CGOs would provide a common understanding of the priorities and responsibilities of CGOs who are officers in the Profession of Arms, and not only technicians in their specific fields. Second, the Think Tank recommends creating a publication to use as a study tool and discussion-starter for learning lessons from others' ethical successes and failures. Third, creating a CGO Toolkit will enable CGOs to focus on continuous professional development, with an emphasis on ethical development and leadership. Finally, The Think Tank suggests creating a "To Do List" to help identify processes that can be eliminated or streamlined to optimize Airmen's time and values.
The Think Tank proposes implementing these courses of action in three steps. The first step is to utilize future Think Tanks at Squadron Officer School to address these issues and carry out the specific actions above. The second step is to create a Cross Check program-essentially franchising the Think Tank process in smaller groups across the Air Force as a forum in which CGOs can lead discussions and address ethical dilemmas with other individuals of all ranks and AFSCs. Finally, the Think Tank proposes that AETC stand up a cell at Maxwell AFB to provide guidance to Cross Check forums that exist across the Air Force. The Reach Back cell would coordinate between Cross Check groups to maximize the positive impact of cross-functional problem-solving power by distributing information so others can build on the problems and solutions that are being discussed. Think Tank 14D suggests that these moral and ethical lapses are occurring in an Air Force culture that spans a spectrum of behavior-from behavior that degrades the Core Values to that which promotes them, as shown in Figure 1 . This spectrum exists in a complex service-wide culture of competing and conflicting values that can create a moral dilemma for Airmen. An individual who is faced with such a dilemma will make choices that are determined by factors that positively or negatively influence their ethical behavior. An organization can also influence fu this paper, those factors will be refen ed to as "drivers" because they direct and propel behavior by exacting influences on the actor that is subject to them. This paper proposes that 
I. Framing The Analysis
"
Research Limitations & Methodology
To adequately understand the Think Tank's research methodology, it is important to consider the limitations of scope and resources placed upon the researchers. First, student volunteers conducted this project over seven weeks, in addition to completing Squadron Officer School curriculum. This complex topic is worthy of an entire social science dissertation;
however, the time limitation prevented the Think Tank from doing additional research to expand upon some points within this paper. Although the Think Tank believes it has provided a quality assessment, time did not permit more thorough research methods such as interviewing individuals involved in the Lackland basic training and Malmstrom cheating scandals, or to conduct a survey of other ranks throughout the Air Force. Second, the perspective of the Think Tank participants (Captains with 4-8 years of commissioned AF service) is likely different than individuals of other ranks and experience; thus, the conclusions and actions proposed only reflect the perceptions and world views of a portion of CGOs. Additionally, the Think Tank's task was narrowly-scoped: the proposed courses of action had to be largely CGO-driven and implemented. The narrow scope of the task continually vectored the team away from recommendations for institutional or higher-level changes during the literature review, course-ofaction development, and refinement phases of this project.
Using the concepts of the ethical spectrum, core drivers, and moral gravity, Think Tank 14D approached the question by reframing it: rather than assuming that these ethical and moral lapses are isolated instances, these lapses were considered to be punctuated events on a spectrum of ethical behavior. This paper proposes that the spectrum of behavior that exists in the Air Reserve, and Air National Guard officers may be underrepresented in this sample, as 100-percent in-residence SOS attendance is currently not required for these groups. The survey contained 45 questions on a Likert Scale and 13 free response questions. The Likert Scale is a commonly used scale in questionnaires that allows respondents to rate their feelings for a specific item (i.e. strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree). Of the surveys distributed, respondents returned 115, providing a 92% response rate. The survey was not intended to be a scientifically-precise assessment of experience, opinion, and behavior; rather students were polled to ensure that the experiences of the members of the Think Tank were, in fact, fairly representative of the experiences and opinions of the rest of the students at SOS.
After considering personal experience, case studies, military literature, psychoanalytical and sociological research, as well as the survey results, the various organizational and individual drivers that influence ethical behavior at all levels were listed and discussed. Because many of these factors were very similar, overlapped, or were interrelated, they were consolidated into six broadly-framed core drivers. This consolidation was accomplished by identifying the fewest overarching categories that would be collectively exhaustive of the underlying larger set. Think Tank 14D also considered the extent to which a CGO could affect a given factor when choosing these core drivers. Although not directed by Air Force policy, one can derive a moral framework from Air Force Core Values. According to Col Charles Myers, when Airmen use the Core Values for moral reasoning, it is important that they see that each of the Core Values expresses both obligations and aspirations. When placed into a potential framework, our "Integrity First" obligation and standard is to have integrity by being honest and forthright. Our "Service Before Self" standard is to serve through unconditional obedience to lawful orders. Our "Excellence in All We Do" standard is to use every effort to accomplish the mission. In addition, Airmen should aspire to be people of integrity, placing Air Force service before their individual interests, and pursuing excellence in all areas, not only mission accomplishment.
14 However, one concern Colonel Myers expressed was the potential this framework becomes one of evaluation wherein Study of historical figures can be a form of utilizing mentorship, though it is not effective in terms of obtaining tailored advice and feedback about particular situations. It is, however, a form of leveraging the experience and knowledge of others and applying it to one's own circumstances, which is the point of mentorship. Some Airmen do not feel as though they have a mentor in the Air Force-of the 115 current SOS students who completed the survey, only 47% responded that they had someone in the Air Force they would call a mentor.
Without mentorship, Airmen may find themselves in situations where they do not know the appropriate response, and they do not know where to turn for assistance. In these cases, personal accountability to the Air Force Core Values is paramount, and Airmen of all ranks are placed in positions of responsibility with the expectation that they can meet the challenges they face. A lack of mentorship, however, can create an environment in which moral and ethical failures occur because Airmen do not have mentors who are positive counterbalances for the moral gravity that begins to take effect. In this type of workplace, Airmen may start to develop a tunnel-vision mentality that fails to recognize their role in the Air Force mission, take shortcuts, easy fixes can become systemic problems, and cynicism can become more prevalent.
Learning From Previous Lapses
Mentorship can take many forms. One important form of mentorship consists of communicating lessons learned from one's experiences, both positive and negative. Air Force leaders of all ranks should take advantage of opportunities to learn from other's positive and negative leadership experiences. Exposure to these lessons learned goes beyond teaching CGOs how to respond to ethical, moral, and criminal lapses; it also provides CGOs an opportunity to learn about what drivers led up to these lapses and how they could have been prevented. Often, the Air Force does not effectively communicate information to Airmen (particularly CGOs) that Unlike squadron, group, and wing commanders who are able to attend a SOD meeting each quarter, CGOs generally do not have access to a forum in which lapses are discussed. Thus they may not be exposed to the range of moral, ethical, and criminal lapses at their installation, their leaders' discipline philosophy and most importantly, they do not have the opportunity to learn from other leaders' experiences. Often, the first time a CGO will have to deal with a lapse is when they are a flight commander. When a CGO steps into a flight commander role it is often the first time they have had the authority to exercise discipline. Unfortunately, CGOs are often left out of the loop when higher-level commanders take disciplinary actions that affect their subordinates.
Similarly, CGOs are not required to and often do not attend courts-martials being conducted on their installations. The first time they ever see a court-martial is possibly when they are selected to be on the jury panel and are charged with deciding the guilt, innocence, or punishment of a fellow Airman. Additionally, CGOs, unless they are commanders, do not impose nonjudicial punishment via Article 15, as doing so requires G-series orders.
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Nonjudicial punishment is not a "public" process; as a result CGOs in the squadron are not typically aware of the actions taken. Though the base legal office typically writes articles for the base paper or website about completed actions, the information may not be utilized at all leadership levels to open a discussion about the lessons learned from these actions.
CGOs (and Airmen service-wide) have even less exposure to the lessons learned from purely moral or ethical lapses (which might not rise to the criminal level 
Locus of Control
Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Welsh, has said "if it doesn't make common sense, if it doesn't make the mission better, if it doesn't take better care of our people, then just don't do it and tell your boss you are done."
29 General Welsh's statement empowers Airmen at all levels to make a positive change. General Welsh has authorized and empowered Airmen to speak up and address inefficiencies and situations in which their tasks do not make common sense. Therefore, leaders at all levels should strive to create a culture in which Airmen are empowered to carry out General Welsh's instructions and identify things that do not make common sense or take care of people or the mission, thereby freeing up time and energy to invest in process-improvements that will result in a more ethically-sound environment. In a culture where trust, transparency and accountability are emphasized, Airmen are more likely to feel as though they have an internal locus of control-essentially, the ability to make positive changes, rather than have circumstances imposed upon them from external sources. ethical lapses, maintaining a unified group vision to resolve competing values, creating a culture of trust, transparency and accountability, and promoting a culture in which Airmen feel empowered to make positive changes-will result in more ethical decision-making. These suggestions are the foundation of the courses of actions proposed below.
III. What Can CGOs Do Now?
CGOs are in a position to influence change towards driving ethical behavior in their As CGOs we are fully capable technicians and operators -but we are officers first. Beyond merely accomplishing the mission, we strive to constantly improve ourselves and others, mentor younger airmen, and pursue and provide feedback. We relentlessly revise and seek to eliminate processes and requirements that do not advance the mission or promote a positive Air Force culture.
Learn from Ethical Lapses and Reinforce Ethical Behavior. Ethical lapses occurring
throughout the AF can be summarized and disseminated by a network of CGOs for a "lessonlearned" analysis. In its most basic form, peers discussing with each other their personal experiences with lapses that they have observed could carry out this action. In professional military education courses-both by seminar (such as the Leadership Development Program) and correspondence-students could engage in exercises designed to promote critical thinking about ethical dilemmas. To address this more formally, CGOs could create "Core Values Mishap Reports," (see Figure 3 ) which relate sanitized versions of the facts involved in ethical or moral lapses, the root causes, the responses, lessons learned and the question: "What Would You Do?" to prompt critical thinking.
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At all levels of leadership, CGOs must make a conscious effort to reinforce, recognize, and potentially reward ethical behavior. While in their assigned units, they must create a culture in which Airmen exhibiting exceptional ethical decision-making skills that are true to the Core Values are held out as examples to others. Whether it is recognition in a commander's call, a staff meeting, or with a quarterly award for exemplifying the Core Values, highly ethical Airmen should be recognized for their contribution to an ethically-sound Air Force in the same way that Airmen who perform exceptionally in their core tasks or in physical fitness are recognized and rewarded. 33 As with any official publication, the Ethical Mishap Report publication would be reviewed by relevant offices (Security Office, Public Affairs Judge Advocate) to ensure that legal considerations for individuals' privacy and operational security matters are properly protected. Create a CGO Toolkit. Students at SOS have opportunities to read, study and discuss leadership techniques while learning from colleagues in other fields who may have had more or different experiences than they have had. By implementing a process for communicating those development tools, captains at SOS can multiply the value of information they obtain at SOS.
Developing and maintaining a "CGO Toolkit" would benefit the development of CGOs across the Air Force. The Toolkit would be a repository of lessons learned, helpful tips, and useful resources. It could include a CGO reading list (similar to the CSAF Reading List), tips for giving feedback, and multimedia resources that would emphasize success stories and shared experiences. The added value of tools created and chosen by SOS students is that they will be relevant to CGOs "in the field" because they are created and continuously refined by other CGOs who are also "in the field," rather than CGOs who are not at the base level, are out of their career fields, or are personnel who outrank the CGOs and may have varying experiences as current
CGOs.
Streamline Tasks/Processes. CGOs must identify and eliminate tasks that do not support the mission or their roles as "Officers First" and "Stewards of Culture." This essentially entails supporting General Welsh's instruction to Airmen by soliciting input from subordinates about inefficiencies and work task that are taking time, but not supporting the mission. CGOs should use that input from subordinates, as well as their own observations to use innovative ways to reduce inefficiencies, improve processes, and eliminate unnecessary processes or tasks. If those tasks or processes are not something controlled by the CGO, then the CGO should elevate the input to appropriate leadership levels. The goal of streamlining tasks and processes is not to simply create more free time; rather it has a two-fold purpose: 1) creating more time for professional development-the time and effort saved by streamlining tasks can be optimized by using it to engage in mentoring, professional development, or further process improvement; and 2) streamlining tasks could potentially eliminate institutional pressures to commit ethical lapses.
For example, now CBTs often contain an option for taking the quiz at the beginning of the CBT, rather than only at the end of the material. Streamlining the training process allows the same objective to be met (passing the quiz) and has eliminated the temptation to "click through" hours of slides to reach the quiz at the end of the CBT. If CGOs are focused on streamlining tasks in a similar fashion, their time and their fellow Airman's time can be optimized.
IV. How Do CGOs Make This Happen?
The recommended actions described in Section III can be accomplished using three separate entities that complement each other and maximize each other's positive impact on ethical decision-making. First, maintaining the Think Tank program at SOS on a smaller-scale will enable SOS students to contribute to the professional development of the CGO Corps and the Air Force overall, despite the course being condensed to five weeks. Second, CGOs across the Air Force, ideally having been trained at SOS, can implement "Cross Check" programs in their Air Force communities. Cross Checks are cross-functional, multi-rank forums that can be used to address ethical concerns or other issues existing at a base or in a community. Finally, the creation of a Reach Back Cell located at Maxwell Air Force Base could facilitate and coordinate
Cross Checks around the Air Force, provide guidance and continuity to individual Cross Checks, and continually collect resources and ideas for process improvement.
Think Tank Next
SOS has a unique ability to influence the CGO corps. It continually trains thousands of mid-level captains that represent a large cross-section of career fields in the Air Force. Many of the captains at SOS arrive directly "from the field," and therefore are familiar with current trends, strengths, challenges, and resources available to CGOs at the base level. It might be impossible to maintain the Think Tank process as it now exists considering the shortening of SOS to five weeks. An evolution of the Think Tank-Think Tank Next-however, could enable captains at SOS to continue the valuable process even in the condensed timeframe. Think Tanks could be convened in future SOS classes to consider smaller-scale projects and issues, and to create products that are pushed back out to the Air Force CGO Corps at large. As a first step, the captains in Think Tanks at SOS can carry out the four COAs described in Section III. Tanks can then produce a journal that can be shared Air Force wide. This journal could be used as a study tool or as a discussion starter at the base level, ensuring that the Air Force is learning from experiences with ethical lapses and successes to prevent unethical behavior and promote ethical behavior.
Create a CGO Toolkit:
Creating an online CGO Toolkit could multiply the value of the leadership tools captains obtain at SOS. The added value of tools created and chosen by SOS students is that they will be relevant to CGOs "in the field" because they are created and continuously refined by other CGOs who are also "in the field," rather than individuals who are not at the base level, are out of their career fields, or are personnel who outrank the CGOs and may have varying experiences as current CGOs. The Toolkit or Online Forum should contain, but is not limited to:
1) Lessons Learned Publication: Think Tanks could utilize the information they obtain at SOS-through case studies, discussion with peers, and discussion with senior leaders and SNCOs-to produce a journal containing lessons learned from others' experiences with ethical lapses and ethical successes.
2) Professional Reading Recommendations: Think Tanks could make recommendations for professional reading that is relevant to CGO leadership; provide links to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force reading list; or facilitate a blog-centered book club for CGOs.
3) Multimedia Shared Experiences: SOS students could develop TEDx type products to share information and experiences. TED is a popular nonprofit devoted to spreading ideas, usually in the form of short, powerful talks. 34 The Air
Force could utilize a similar professional and popular forum for members to share their experiences (ethics lessons learned, best practices, etc.) and be developed by students at SOS. Senior leaders, in particular, could utilize this form of medium to convey mentorship messages to CGOs and share their experiences and "lessons learned." Ideally, however, all students at SOS would be considering and reconsidering this problem on a continual basis-developing, refining and learning to execute courses of action that they can implement at their home station. In this way, SOS could operate like the USAF Weapons School 35 where mid to senior level captains officers from a particular career field come together to learn in-depth knowledge about their functions, discuss what is going on in the field, and brainstorm about how to better employ airpower. They use their time at weapons school to write the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for their weapon system, and then they return to home station to serve as unit weapons and tactics officers, providing advanced instruction and technical advice to their commanders, operations officers, and personnel. The school also produces the Weapons Review magazine, the Combat Air Force's premier professional tactics publication, collects tactical knowledge and lessons learned, and formally prepares those lessons for application across the force.
Attending SOS is a unique opportunity for captains to spend time, outside of their operational function, entirely devoted to improving their leadership skills and developing processes for continued growth. SOS structure to intentionally educate, equip, and grow the types of CGOs that we have suggested (Officers First, Stewards of Culture, Relentless Streamliners) are best suited to lead in a cultural shift of ethical decision-making at the unit level.
Cross Check
Think Tank 14D proposes the implementation of "Cross Check" programs-essentially franchising the Think Tank at the Wing, base, or even AFSC-level. As described below, the Cross Check program promotes accountability, morally courageous leadership, and a cohesive Air Force identity through an open, solutions-oriented forum, in which participants voluntarily express their concerns and pursue solutions that will be presented directly to senior leaders.
In its basic form, Cross Check involves a meeting between individuals with a common interest in solving a problem. The problem could be one identified by leadership and posed to the group, or a problem the group itself chooses to address. The composition of the Cross Check group is intentionally flexible; it allows for inclusion of various AFSCs, ranks, and is not limited to Active Duty personnel. The Cross Check group meets-either during a specified Wing Down Day or any other convenient time-to discuss root causes of issues and propose solutions. With the assistance of the Reach Back Cell described below, these proposed solutions are eventually up-channeled to senior leaders that can take action and provide feedback to the Cross Check group. Cross Checks are essentially a network for individuals to address potentially critical Air Force problems across AFSCs, ranks, and even geographical location. It is another tool for ground-level CGO leaders to utilize as they take ownership of their organizations and become stewards of positive change.
An important aspect of Cross Check is the low maintenance and time commitment required from participants. Cross Check would be organized and facilitated by only a small cadre of CGO volunteers, and in the spirit of the Think Tank Franchise, the meetings would be action-oriented, and networked together throughout the Air Force to provide lessons-learned, resources, and valuable insight to the problems they wish to solve, before solutions are brought up to leadership.
The initial phase of Cross Check would be devoted to an honest open communication between the CGO, NCO, and civilian member participants from the diverse range of Air Force specialties found on each installation. This phase would emphasize sharing concerns that these Airmen see in their own organizations, across their Wing, and even in the Air Force as a whole.
Once ideas and concerns have been shared, small groups would be formed to enhance collaboration and a brief period would be given to research and organize the ideas they develop for presentation to the Wing Commander. Young leaders would be empowered to resolve their concerns, without any filtering from facilitators, squadron leaders, and community peer groups.
While the issues uncovered in these meetings are important, the cross-functional and cross-grade participate in order for this program to gather the necessary momentum to take hold. This momentum may be very difficult to obtain and maintain. General Officer support-prompted by senior leaders who have experienced the value that can be gained from Think Tank-like groups-could help combat this issue; if senior leaders encourage CGOs to take a more active role in problem solving and assure them that they will be heard, then CGOs at the base level will be more likely to lead and participate in Cross Checks. Additionally, the Reach Back Cell described in the next section should alleviate some of the burden on Cross Check facilitators and provide additional support, motivating CGOs at the base level to engage in Cross Checks. 36 Using Internet forums such as social media sites raises a legitimate concern about OPSEC. Those concerns could be mitigated by working with the unit OPSEC monitor to control access to the forum and screen posts before they are made public.
Cross 
Reach Back Cell
The final piece to the proposed solution is the creation of a reach back capability for When he returns to Base X after SOS, he calls his fellow group execs and the civilian admin assistants and Airmen in the command section, as well as a friend who is a lieutenant in the Force Support Squadron, personnel section. He asks if they want to form a Cross Check group and discuss how they could streamline the award-writing process. They meet and discuss the issue. The other execs agree that this conversion process takes a significant amount of time that they could be using to do other mission-related tasks or devoted to professional development. The lieutenant from FSS explains the awards process at this base, as well as at other bases she has been to, and explains what would be required to change the process. The
Cross Check group discusses some options for improving the process, but then they hit a dead end.
Captain America remembers that at SOS, his Think Tank proctor mentioned a Reach Back Cell that exists to help base level Cross Checks. He calls the Reach Back cell. The captain at the Reach Back Cell informs him that there are at least two other bases considering the same problem, one of which has made significant progress by recommending changes to the Wing's award system. The Reach Back cell puts Captain America in touch with the other two Cross
Check groups, and they discuss the issues they have in common. Captain America relays this information back to his Cross Check group at Base X. They have some additional good ideas, which the Captain relays back to the other Cross Checks. During this process, Captain America has been discussing his concerns and some ideas with his Director of Operations and his Group Commander-they both agree that the awards process is inefficient and could be improved.
They support the Captain America's efforts to propose improvements to the process.
After some brainstorming, the Cross Check group decides to suggest a change to the Wing's award process. Captain America calls back to the Reach Back cell to see whether any other Cross Check groups have submitted a proposal or Staff Summary Sheet that Cross Check at Base X can use as a template. Once he gets the template, he drafts the Cross Check's proposal.
Eventually the proposal makes it to the Wing Commander. The Wing Commander reviews the proposal, asks questions, makes suggestions and ultimately adopts the process improvement suggested by Cross Check. The changes to the process are relayed to the Wing, resulting in significant time saved. Base X's Cross Check experience is noted by the Reach Back Cell's website for others to use as a guide. Additionally, the Wing Commander is so pleased with the initiative of the Cross Check group that he asks them to address another problem that has been plaguing the Wing, and the process begins again.
V. Conclusion
The research presented in this paper supports that the recent ethical violations are 
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The Air Force can improve adherence to the core values through education.
~~--~------------------~
The Air Force can improve adherence to the core values through increasing 1 2 3 4 5 6 accountabilicy l.,;, ·~~~-~-~~~---:--~--~-:--~---. In your career field, a BMTS flight commander position is valuable for our career ro esswn. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Sometimes you have to bend the mles just to get the j ob done. 1 2 3 4 5 6 It is an integrity violation for a cadet at basic training to wake up at 0345 to be in making their bed if they: are told not to wake u before 0400. 1 2 3 4 5 6 32. You believe in our Unit's vision and mission. 1 2 3 4 5 6 33 . Unrealistic expectations ( suspenses, scores, etc) pressure you to consider ...._ __ ___, c ... u -. tt .-iñ,g comers? 1 2 3 4 5 6 34. Ar e you awar e of the disciplinruy actions taken against th e officers involved in the Malmsu·om AFB scandal, their leadership , and the changes to testing .----j)rocedures? 1 If you observed a peer backdate a document to meet a suspense you would 2 3 4 5 6 35.
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confront the individual about it. 1 If you did address your peer in th e above scenru·io and they were unwilling to rectify the situation, you would report the incident to your chain of command or other aj)j)ropriate agency. 1 When you completed tech school, you were passionate about your role in the Air Force. 1 Today, your level of passion for your role in the Air Force has increased. 1 2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6 2 3 4 5 6
Read each statement and rate the degree in which you agree with the state by circling a number ranging from 1 "Much Lower" to 5 "Much Higher." 54. fu a recent speech, Gen Welsh said "if it doesn't make common sense, if it doesn't make the mission better, if it doesn 't take better care of om people, then just don't do it and tell yom boss you are done." How many homs per week do you devote to tasks that don't make sense, don't make the mission better, or don 't help yom people? _ Word of mouth Official AF Comms Other ( )
57.
What do you believe is the root cause of risk-adverse leadership in the AF (circle one)?
1) No tolerance from senior leaders for less than perfect results 2) No tolerance from senior leaders for mistakes/failure 3) No tolerance from senior leaders for poor "optics"/ public perception 4) No tolerance from senior leaders for any negative mark on senior leader 5) Fear of impact to promotion 6) Other -Please explain.
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What do you believe is the root cause across all the recent breaches in Air Force Core Values? (sexual assaults, cheating on tests, etc.) (circle one) 1) Failure of leadership to monitor and address problems 2) Lack of accountability promotes risk-taking 3) Sense of entitlement among senior ranking offenders 4) American society's morals/ethics are deteriorating causing 'trickle'down" effect in AF 5) Ethical leadership and integrity are valued less by the Air Force than making (the organization) self/unit leaders look good 6) Other -Please explain.
